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Blood Transfusions and Elective Surgery:
A Custodial Function of an Ohio Juvenile Court
M. J. Zaremski*
Juvenile Court has traditionally been though of, within American
jurisprudence, as an appendage of the state acting as parens patriae.
This obligation dates back to the ancient role of the sovereign as
protector of helpless children.' An abundance of case law has con-
strued and reinterpreted this doctrine, but none has significantly
deviated from the general definition. Therefore, the description given
in Black's Law Dictionary that parens patriae refers ". . to the
sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability . . .
such as minors . . ." will suffice for the purposes of the ensuing dis-
cussion.2 These individuals include delinquent, dependent, and ne-
glected children.
In opposition to parens patriae is the feeling that a court should
not invade the parents' sanctified right to care for their offspring.
This is a natural right and a liberty within due process. 3 Another
basis for criticism of parens patriae is that the family should not
be transgressed as a socioeconomic unit by having a court place its
child, temporarily or permanently, within a surrounding which only
the court feels is more conducive to normal child development.
Though "normalcy" is a subjective factor depending upon the facts
of each case, a court will transcend family boundaries because the
child is considered a citizen of the state. True, parents should raise
their children as they deem proper.4 However, since the state has
acquired the sovereign's duty to oversee youth within its domain,
the state has the responsibility to safeguard a minor's welfare and
his ability to prosper in an environment devoid of social mores dis-
dained by the majority of society. The state in a democracy has an
obligation to protect the welfare of children, irrespective of any
parental right.5 Moreover, as stated in In re Clark,6 parents do not
own the bodies of their children, nor may they consider them their
chattels. Nonetheless, parent-state relationships generally are not
* B.S., Univ. of Illinois; J.D., Case-Western Reserve Univ.; Member of the Illinois Bar.
1 Falkland v. Bertie, 2 Vern 342 (1696); see Eyre v. Shaftsburg, 2 P. Wins. 103, 24 Eng.
Rep. 659 (1722).
2See Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect On the Constitutional Limits of
Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 894 (1966).
3Nebraska v. Myers, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
4 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
5 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
690 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 25, 26, 185 N.E.2d 128, 131 (C.P. Lucas County 1962).
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difficult to comprehend, for a substantial portion of juvenile decisions
concern children whose parents are unable or unwilling to care for
their offspring due to lack of financial support, cruel and abusive
behavior, habitual intoxication, or the like. Such traits prostitute
the minor's moral, physical, and mental well being.
One area wherein parent-state roles are not easily differentiated
is that in which parents, willing and able to support their children,
nevertheless subject them to certain religious beliefs. No better
example exists than that of Jehovah's Witnesses who forbid their
children to receive blood transfusions. Jehovah's Witness parents
adhere to the principle that consumption of blood from others is
scripturally prohibited.7 Though there is no record of a court of
chancery ordering medical treatment, modern tribunals have relied
upon an English doctrine that medicine is a "necessary" of life. A
child must be furnished necessaries of life, and since medicine is
considered as such, the court under parens patriae power may order
medical treatment. Courts have thus held that where a blood trans-
fusion is necessary for the preservation of the child's life, religious
beliefs will be disregarded.8 This determination is in accord with
three Supreme Court cases: Reynolds v. United States,9 which holds
that:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opin-
ions, they may with practices . . . ;
Cantwell v. Connecticut," which affirms that:
the [first] Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the
nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains sub-
ject to regulation for the protection of society ...
and Prince v. Massachusetts," wherein the Court stated:
but the right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose ... the child ... to ill health.
7 Genesis 9:3, 4; Leviticus 3:17; 17:14; Deuteronomy 12:23; Acts 15:28, 29; I Samuel
14:32, 33.
8In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d
97. (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d
769 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re Clark, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 185
N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Lucas County 1962); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 462, 181 A.2d 751,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Jehovah Witnesses of Washington v. King County
Hosp., 278 F.Supp. 488 (D. Wash. 1967), afl'd, 390 U.S. 598, rehearing denied, 391 U.S.
961 (1968). See also In re Brooks Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) which
holds that an emergency patient with no minor children may not be compelled to have a
blood transfusion where it violates her religious beliefs.
998 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
10 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
11 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
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Of particular importance within these transfusion cases are
juvenile court hearings involving "non-emergencies." A non-
emergency is one where the impending danger to a child's life or
limb would not occur even if the minor were not to receive immediate
treatment.12 The New York Family Court in In re Sampson13
represents one of the very few jurisdictions to sustain an order of
temporary custody so that a child whose life was not in peril could
receive a transfusion. The child's mother was a Jehovah's Witness.
Kevin Sampson, fifteen years of age, suffered from neurofibro-
matosis, "Von Recklinghausen's disease." This ailment results in a
massive facial and neck deformity that is grotesque and repulsive.
Testimony established that this dermatologic abnormality did not
affect Kevin's sight, hearing, or mental capacity. However, the mere
sight of Kevin's disfigurement was apt to:
.. exert a most negative effect upon his personality develop-
ment, his opportunity for education and later employment,
and upon every phase of his relationship with his peers and
others.1 4
The surgical procedure recommended by Kevin's attending physicians
was risky, and not necessary to maintain his health. It could not
cure the boy, but could improve his physical appearance. A blood
transfusion was needed for the surgery.
Judicial analysis developed as follows. Jurisdiction of New York's
Family Court extends to all children under eighteen years of age
whose physical, mental, or emotional condition is impaired,15 or
children physically handicapped as defined in either Family Court
Act § 232 (c) 16 or Public Health Law § 2581.17 In addition, Family
Court Act § 232 (b) provides: "Whenever a child within the juris-
diction of the court appears to the court to be in need of medical,
surgical, therapeutic or hospital care or treatment, a suitable order
may be made therefor."1 The court read these provisions in light
of Family Court Act § 414 giving Judges of the Family Court "...
12 See Pilpel and Zuckerman, Abortion and the Right of Minors, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
779, 782 (1972).
1365 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Family Ct. 1970), afl'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 668,
323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918
(1972). Sampson's principles received approval in In re Karwarth, 199 N.W.2d 147
(Iowa 1972). See also In re D., 70 Misc. 2d 953, 335 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Family Ct. 1972);
In re Comm'rs of Social Services, 72 Misc. 2d 428, 339 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Family Ct. 1972).
1465 Misc. 2d 658, 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (Family Ct. 1970).
TsSee N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT §§ 1011-1013 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
16 N.Y. JUDICIARY-COURT ACTS (McKinney Supp. 1973).
17 N.Y.PUBLIc HEALTH LAw (McKinney 1971).
16 N.Y. JUDICIARY-COURT ACTS (McKinney 1963).
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wide discretion and grave responsibilities,"' 9 and the recent revision
of Article 10 [Family Court Act], bestowing upon the Family Court
"... exclusive jurisdiction and ample authority to deal with ... the
neglected child. ' 2 From the latter, the Family Court felt that the
legislature intended to confer upon the court ". . . the broadest power
and discretion .... ,"21 In other words, the court found Kevin to be
physically handicapped, neglected, and in need of medical, surgical,
therapeutic or hospital care and treatment. This finding was based
upon Family Court Act §§ 1011, 1013, 232 and Public Health Law
§ 2581, none of which explicitly denied jurisdiction in non-emergencies.
A liberal reading of section 232 (b) also established the court's
prerogative to order a blood transfusion where life was not in peril.
Kevin received the transfusion.
The Sampson court relied upon varied judicial precedent in
justifying its use of the parens patriae doctrine. In In re Clark* a
male child suffered from second and third degree burns over forty
per cent of his body. His parents were Jehovah's Witnesses and
refused permission for a needed blood transfusion. Though an emer-
gency did exist in Clark and not in Sampson, the language of Clark
used by the Sampson court with regard to freedom of worship and
parental right to care, seems applicable not only to emergencies, but
to non-emergencies as well:
... [T]his right [of religion] of [the parents] ends where
somebody else's rights begins. Their child is a human being
in his own right with a soul and body of his own. He has
rights of his own - the right to live and grow up without
disfigurement .... [The state has] the duty to protect his
right to live and grow up with a sound mind in a sound body,
and to brook no interference with that right by any person
or organization. 23
Sampson is a judicial maverick in proceedings wherein a child
faces elective surgery. For example, In re Tuttendario2 4 held that
parents who refused to allow an operation upon their child for
rickets were not so cruel or so maliciously neglectful as to authorize
a court to take custody for purposes of an operation. A female minor
in In re Hudson25 suffered from an abnormally large arm resulting
in undue stress upon the girl's heart. Medical experts testified that
1965 Misc. 2d 658, 670, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 657 (Family Ct. 1970).
20 d. at 671, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
21 Id.
290 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1962).
23Id. at 27-28, 185 N.E.2d at 132.
221 Pa. Dist. 561 (Super. Ct. 1912); See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 2d 1138-41 (1953).
25 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
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amputation of the arm was indicated, although such an operation
posed a risk to the child's life. Her parents believed in faith healing.
The court refused to find the child neglected, since the evidence did
not suggest that the child's life was in danger, since there was no
indication that her parents otherwise improperly cared for her, and
since the law views parents as the natural guardians of their minor
children, entitled to custody and control.2 6 Sampson has even departed
from precedent set forth in prior New York decisions.27
Similarly, by a four-three vote, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in In re Green28 reversed their superior court's custody order for
sixteen-year-old Ricky Ricardo Green. He suffered from poliomyelitis
and paralytic scoliosis. The latter resulted in ninety-four degree
curvature of the spine, and as a consequence Ricky was unable to
stand or ambulate. He would become a bed patient if a spinal fusion
were not performed. Though the operation was dangerous, his
mother conditionally consented to it. However, she objected to a
needed transfusion, because her beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness for-
bade. it. The court concluded:
. . . as between a parent and the state, the state does not
have an interest of sufficient magnitude outweighing a
parent's religious beliefs when the child's life is not immedi-
ately imperiled by his physical condition [emphasis by the
court] .29
In addition to giving prominence to the custodial rights of
parents, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Ricky himself would accept
or reject surgery.30 The hearing is similar to the one conducted in
26Id. at 676, 679, 707, & 711, 126 P.2d at 768, 769, 781, & 783.
2The lower court in In re Seiferth, 285 App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (Sup. Ct. 1955)
was reversed in its decision ordering an operation for a male child over the objection of
his father, a faith healer. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955). Though the boy suffered
from cleft palate and congenital hair lip, the court said his life was not in peril and
therefore not neglected. The court did consider the extreme antagonism of the boy
toward the operation before making its decision. But see In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948,
950, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941) (". . . the Justices of this Court [may]
order an operation not only in an instance where the life of the child is to be saved but
also in instances where the health, the limb, the person or the future of the child is at
stake."); and In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (Sup. Ct. 1933)(emphasis added).
28220 Pa. Super. 191, 286 A.2d 681 (1971), rev'd, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972),
dimissal aff'd upon rehearing, 452 Pa. 313, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).
29 292 A.2d 387, 392 (1972).
30 At the hearing, the boy answered all questions without hesitation and seemed to under-
stand both the benefits that he might receive from the operation and the possible con-
sequences of not having it. He said he had been in the hospital for a long period already
and that no one would guarantee that the operation would be successful. Dismissal was
affirmed in In re Green, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).
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Seiferth.31 It would appear that by requiring a child's opinion, the
parents' natural right of custody will not be as highly regarded as
will the request of the mature minor.32 Additionally, seeking the
minor's concurrence diminishes state authority, by the court's favor
of the individual child's opinion over the state's as parens patriae.
Quaere, whether a mature child can better judge his own medical
condition than can the state, in its position as an objective third party.
Parents are one party and their offspring, as represented by a state
agency, the other. Neither parent nor child could be objective in com-
prehending the signficance of the custodial proceeding. The parents
are concerned with exercising independent judgment as their natural
custodial role would dictate, whereas the child is not only concerned
with his medical prognosis, but also with the conflict between recog-
nizing his parents' authority, and realizing his own best interests.
The language in Green ordering a hearing to determine the
minor's wishes is similiar to that used by (then) Judge Cardozo in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.33 Judge Cardozo con-
cluded that individuals of adult years and sound mind have a right
to determine what will be done with their bodies. However, in
Sampson the Family Court decided that to place upon the boy the
responsibility for making a choice would be neither expedient nor
proper.34 This is consistent with the principle of parens patriae,
under which the state, not the child, makes the decisions regarding
that child.
Ohio Law: Jurisdiction
Despite In re Clark, Ohio courts have never adjudicated the
situation of a child who requires a transfusion necessary for elective
surgery, but whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. However, the
groundwork for deciding these facts has been laid. The thrust of
this discussion shall be to now apply precedent and interpretation
with applicable provisions of the Ohio Revised Code in order to
decide custody of such a minor were he to come before an Ohio
juvenile court. For sake of brevity, it will be assumed as a hypo-
31 Supra note 27. Despite the antagonism displayed by the child in Seiferth, Judge (now
Chief Judge) Field, in dissent, stated:
Every child has a right, so far as is possible, to lead a normal life and, if his
parents, through viciousness or ignorance, act in such a way as to endanger that
right, the courts should, as the legislature has provided, act on his behalf ....
It is quite true that the child's physical life is not at peril - as would be the
situation if he had an infected appendix or a growth on the brain - but it may
not be questioned . . . . 'What is in danger is his chance for a normal useful
life.' 309 N.Y. 80, 86, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1955).
32 See Pilpel and Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 804.
33211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). See also Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350
P.2d 1093 (1960).
3See 65 Misc. 2d 658, 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 655 (Family Ct. 1970).
[Vol. 23:231
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thetical that both parents are Jehovah's Witnesses, that they are
the natural parents of the child, that their child is economically
dependent upon them, and that the child is residing in their home.
An Ohio juvenile court may take jurisdiction over any child
under eighteen years of age who is either dependent, deliquent, un-
ruly, a juvenile traffic offender, or neglected. 5 Where the child's life
is in immediate danger, the court is empowered to order temporary
custody for purposes of emergency medical treatment. 6 However,
where the child's health is not in danger, but his parents refuse a
transfusion necessary for elective surgery (even for religious rea-
sons), juvenile court must first find the child neglected." This section
includes as neglected any child ". . . whose parents, guardian, or
custodian neglects or refuses to provide him with proper or neces-
sary ... medical or surgical care ... necessary for his health, morals
or well being ..... " Reference might be made to Ohio Revised Code
§ 2151.03 (E) which states that a child treated through prayer and
spiritual means of a recognized religion instead of through standard
medical or surgical care is not a neglected child for that reason alone.
This provision, however, refers to Christian Scientists, not Jehovah's
Witnesses.
To state that Jehovah's Witness parents neglect their child under
a literal reading of § 2151.03 (C) for not granting their consent to a
blood transfusion would be a harsh interpretation. Ohio case law is
deficient on this point. For example, In re Mintonm defined "neglect"
as including parents who are indifferent or manifest wilfulness toward
their offspring. The court in In re Burkhart39 stated that "neglect" is
demonstrated by evidence reflecting faults parents possess which
render them unfit and unsuitable to have custody and care of their
children, since they are incapable of extending proper parental care
to such children. Jehovah's Witness parents who otherwise provide
a stable environment for their children should not fall within either
35 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.011(B) (1), 2151.23 (Page Supp. 1969).
36 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.33 (OHIo RULES JUv. PROC. [ORJP] 13 [eff. July 1,
1972)).
37 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(C) (Page Supp. 1969) The child might also be a
"dependent child" as defined in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(Page Supp. 1969).
This section is not defined in terms of parental fault, but in terms of the child who lacks
proper care or support through the mental or physical condition of his parents. A
"dependent child" is also a child whose condition or environment is such as warrants
the state, in the best interests of the child, to take guardianship. This statute is quite
broad and open to many interpretations. Normally, a juvenile court confronted with the
child of Jehovah's Witness parents will find him neglected before ordering the trans-
fusion. Accord, see infra note 49.
3 112 Ohio App. 361, 176 N.E.2d 252 (1960).
3, 15 Ohio Misc. 170, 175, 239 N.E.2d 772 (Juv. Ct. Warren County 1968).
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of these definitions, 40 as believing in biblical scriptures does not
render them indifferent, wilful, or incapable of extending proper
care.
Such definitions of "neglect" and the individual words com-
posing Ohio Revised Code § 2151.03 indicate that Ohio tribunals
are at the mercy of vague subjective tests implied from reading
Code § 2151.03 in toto. Yet, most neglect statutes, including § 2151.03,
intend to encompass the physical, emotional, social, and physiological
deterioration of the child.41 It is the breadth and spirit of these statutes
which must be challenged. Even though Jehovah's Witness parents
possess the ability to raise their children, since Ohio Revised Code
§ 2151.03 (C) specifically refers to a neglected child as one denied
health and medical attention, "neglect" should be construed with a
broader perspective, and defined as ". . . the failure to exercise the
care that circumstances justly demand." It should not be a term of
fixed and measured meaning.42
Furthermore, selected provisions of Ohio's Juvenile Court Act
were revised in 1969. This revision included Ohio Revised Code
§ 2151.03. Despite the unavailability of legislative history on the
revised portion of the Act, it is apparent that the 1969 revisions were
based in part upon the New York Family Court Act,4 and the
Uniform Juvenile Court Act (July, 1968 draft).44
The Uniform Juvenile Court Act does not refer to a child as
"neglected," but rather as "deprived." A "deprived child" is one
• . . without proper parental care or control . . . or other
care necessary for his physical, mental or emotional health
. .. (emphasis added). 45
40 This is particularly so, for the child's health is not in danger. Also, quaere whether under
OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.03, belief in holy scriptures that contradict sound medical pro-
cedures is a "fault" of the parents. See also supra note 37.
41 See Comment, Montana's Child Neglect Law - A Need for Revision, 13 MONT. L. REV.
201, 205 (1969). On medical neglect within neglect statutes, see, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, tit. 11 § 243(c) (1965); WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.13(1)(e), 48.53(1)(d)
(1957). Neglect in Missouri is defined as failure to provide necessary medical care,
"... except that reliance by a parent, guardian, or custodian upon remedial treatment
other than medical or surgical treatment for a child shall not be construed as neglect when
treatment is recognized or permitted under the laws of this state." Mo. REV. STAT. §
211.031(a) (1959). See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.181.
42 Gill, The Legal Nature of Neglect, 6 N.P.P.A.J. 1, 6 (1968); Sullivan, Child Neglect:
The Environmental Aspects, 29 OHIO ST. L. J. 85, 91 (1968); see Young, The Problem
of Neglect - The Legal Aspects, 4 J. FAM. L. 29 (1964); 31 AM. JUR. Juvenile Courts
§ 37. See also supra note 41.
4 See section 141 of N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT, supra note 18, and accompanying text.
"42 OHIO BAR 1390 (November 10, 1969). See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, GUIDES TO THE JUDGE IN MEDICAL ORDERS AFFECTING CHILDREN,
109-120 (April 1968); and the Juvenile Court Acts of California (CALIFORNIA WEL-
FARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE 500 et seq. (West 1972)) and Colorado (COLO. REV.
STAT. Title 37 (1963)).
45 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK,
UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT (1968 Draft), 249 (1968).
(Vol. 23:231
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The official comment to this section emphasizes that the definition
focuses upon the needs of the child regardless of fault.46 Further,
where the health and physical condition of the child is in issue, the
child's health should be the controlling factor.47 By referring to
statutes used as foundation for the 1969 revision, and other inter-
pretations focusing upon the dimension of "neglect,"48 an Ohio
juvenile court would have little difficulty in finding jurisdiction over
a minor in the hypothetical.4 9
The Juvenile: Treatment by Ohio Courts
After acquiring jurisdiction, the juvenile court must ultimately
decide whether the religious freedom of our hypothetical Jehovah's
Witness parents should be subordinated to the state's interest in
meeting its responsibility as parens patriae. Other considerations,
however, include the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to exercise their
beliefs in Ohio; whether parental care and custody includes the
prerogative to refuse a transfusion where no emergency exists; the
impact of parens patriae on Ohio tribunals; and the child's right and
ability to be the guardian of his own body.
First, with respect to religious freedom, Ohio courts recognize
the first amendment right as enunciated in art. I, § 7 of the Ohio
constitution. However, Ohio jurisprudence has developed within the
scope of Reynolds v. United States50 and principles established in
Cantwell v. Connecticut 51 and Prince v. Massachusetts.52 In re
ClarkO is determinative of the Ohio view as it states:
46Id. at 250. See supra note 37.
47 27 AM. JuR. Infants, § 108; See Note, Montana's Child Neglect Law, supra note 41, and
Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Treatment, 6 FAM. L. Q. 279, 317 (1972).
"Note, Montana's Child Neglect Law, supra note 41. "[Neglect is] not only a failure to
provide necessaries of life - sustenance, clothing, shelter, food and warmth - but a
failure to care, to look after, to guide, to superimpose and . . . to direct the activities of
a child . .. [When a parent . . . is appraised of the physical ailments of the child
and does nothing about correcting the conduct or correcting the condition which produced
the physical ailment, that would constitute neglect." Pilpel and Zuckerman, supra note 12,
at 790, quoting In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952).
49The Honorable Angelo J. Gagliardo, Judge, Cuyahoga County, Ohio Juvenile Court,
believes the failure of parents to provide medical or surgical care necessary for the health,
morals or well-being of a minor would constitute neglect under Ohio law. This is
irrespective of the child's physical condition. Letter from Judge Angelo J. Gagliardo to
M. J. Zaremski, October 27, 1972. The Honorable John J. Toner, Judge, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio Juvenile Court, substantially concurs with his colleague's viewpoint. Letter
from Judge John J. Toner to M. J. Zaremski, November 2, 1972.
5098 U.S. 145 (1878).
5 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2321 U.S. 158 (1944).
S39 0 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1962).
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... religious doctrines and dogmas, be they . . . sound . . .
may not control. [The parents' right to worship as they
please] ends where somebody else's right begins.m
Second, as a general principle of Ohio law, the natural parents'
interest is paramount to that of the state in the care and protection
of their children. 5 Yet, where custody of the minor child must be
litigated, Ohio courts of general jurisdiction adopt the "best interests"
rule.5 6 Juvenile courts also follow this doctine. 57 One facet of the
best interests rule is the court's obligation to listen to the child. This
duty is often employed in determining custody incident to a divorce
proceeding; subject to court approval, a child fourteen years of
age or older may decide with which parent he wishes to live." These
choices are not limited to divorce actions.59
Neither parent nor state may jeopardize or deny a child's right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. For parents to refuse
permission for a blood transfusion where no emergency exists is not
to deny their offspring the right of life or personal freedom, at least
when interpreted literally. Such a denial may, however, amount to
interference with their child's right to health, personal freedom
from the medical ailment, and thus to happiness. An analysis of any
depth must surely recognize that life and happiness cannot be
mutually exclusive." The latter is probably the paramount element
to enjoying the former. Indeed, safeguarding health is enmeshed
within the concept of life and personal freedom vis-a-vis the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.61 A child cannot respond to his environment
by growing up as an invalid, or by living with an abnormality if
surgery can reasonably mend it. One type of happiness is the ability
to live without fear of scorn, not having to hide one's disfigurement,
and not being secluded in some outcast residence. To experience the
joys and pleasures of youth is an essential liberty of humanity; being
respected by one's peers is an experience to be personally enjoyed,
not merely one to be possessd by others. Where total or partial cure
exists, compassion and sympathy for being physically disabled, and
respect for the sanctity of Holy Scriptures, cannot be substituted.
41d. at 27, 185 N.E.2d at 132.
55
n re Devote, 111 Ohio App. 1, 167 N.E.2d 381 (1959); OHIO REv. CODE § 3101.01(consent to marry); In re Clark, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 55 (C.P. Lucas County 1962).
56 OHIO R. CIrv. P. 75 (P); cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page 1973); Harper v.
Harper, 98 Ohio App. 359, 129 N.E.2d 471 (1954); 41 OHIO JUR. 2D, Parent and
Child 16; UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 402.
57See Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299 (1877); 33 OHIO JuR. 2D, Juvenile Courts 50.
58 OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page 1973).
"I1n re Custody of Smelser, 22 Ohio Misc. 41, 44, 257 N.E.2d 769 (Juv. Ct. Preble County
1969).
60 Pilpel and Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 801.
61 Id. at 804.
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Third, parens patriae is as equally important a doctrine as
custodial rights of parents. If the roles of parent and state were
looked upon as interlocking circles, the portion common to both
would include the parent-state conflict inherent in all of the cases in
this area. For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
§ 402, determines custody in accordance with the child's best interest
by considering, among other factors, the parents' opinions, as well
as the mental and physical health of all individuals concerned. Section
402 appears to be a microcosm of decisions Ohio juvenile courts
must make when confronted with religious scruples in an elective
surgery situation. That is, in theory, the choice of parents qualified
and competent to furnish the requisite care for their minor child
should be as important to the court as the interests of a child whose
life is not perilously in danger.6 2 Though the weight given either side
of this dichotomy rests upon the evidence of each case, two view-
points remain apparent. As applied to the child in the hypothetical
case set out earlier in this work, if Ohio law were construed as
inflexible and trailing social mores and individual needs, beliefs of
Jehovah's Witness parents would be of primary importance, the
assumption again being that they are able to care and provide an
adequate environment for their child. Also, the more conservative,
traditional view would be that parents who have educated, supported,
nourished, clothed, and loved their child, possess the right to deny
permission for a transfusion. Alternatively, if justice is to serve
individualistic requirements, as reflected by society's norms, 63 and
not the family unit, then the action of a juvenile court should be in
accord with carrying out the state's role as parens patriae. For a
court to so act is not to adjudicate such Jehovah's Witness parents
as unfit under Ohio law. A juvenile court could permit the child to
remain with his parents, subject to such conditions as the court
prescribed, including supervision directed by the court for the pro-
tection of the child."
Fourth, the duty to perform in Sampson precluded an obligation
to foist the ultimate decision upon the child.65 However, no matter
how great the burden, when a minor child has the capacity and
'
2 This is especially true of the child unable to make an intelligent decision, and one who
is unemancipated.
63Though conceding "normalcy" to be subjective, it is presumed that readers have acquired
the knowledge and experience to define the boundaries of normal childhood development.
Furthermore, a technical discussion of child psychology and child development would not
be useful in determining the issues presented by this discussion.
6"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (A) (Page Supp. 1969); accord, Santos v. Goldstein,
12 N.Y.2d 672, 233 N.Y.S.2d 465, 185 N.E.2d 904 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1962). Contra,
People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (1911). See GUIDES TO THE
JUDGE IN MEDICAL ORDERS AFFECTING CHILDREN, supra note 44, at 117-19.
1SIn re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 656 (Ulster County Fain. Ct. 1970).
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maturity to understand the nature and potential consequences of
the medical procedure about to be undertaken for his benefit, the
minor's wishes will be honored and binding.66 Lacey v. Laird67 ap-
pears to stand for this principle in Ohio. Although jurisdiction of
juvenile court extends to any child under eighteen,6 it is an arbitrary
standard to consider age in determining one's maturity vis-a-vis
understanding the implications of a surgical procedure. For instance,
a fourteen-year-old who can express his preference for the parent
with whom he wishes to live69 may or may not be able to determine
the future of his health 0 Despite the court's use of age as a guide-
line, only evidence in each case will determine whether the child has
obtained the requisite intelligence and maturity to rationally consider
his medical state. In making the decision, a juvenile court may
want to consider other medico-legal areas wherein the necessity for
parental consent is insignificant. Specific reference is made to the
forty-four states and the District of Columbia that allow treatment
of veneral disease in minors without parental consent.71 Prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Bolten,72 state statutes also
varied in their requirements for an unemancipated minor to request
an abortion. Eleven states permitted minors to obtain abortions
66 Pilpel and Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 782-83.
67 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956); accord, Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562
(1906); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 59 (1934); Pilpel and Zuckerman,
supra note 12, at 781.
6OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.011(B) (1), 2151.23 (Page 1969).
69 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page 1969).
70 Cf. HANDBOOK OF . . . COMMISSIONERS ON . . . STATE LAwS, supra note 45. Age
recognition of Lacey, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956), is not unique. In Illinois,
a person eighteen years of age or older, a married minor, or a pregnant woman who is
a minor may consent to medical or surgical procedures. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 § 18.1
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1971). An unemancipated minor in Mississippi of sufficient
intelligence to understand and appreciate the proposed medical or surgical procedure may
effectively consent. Miss. CODE ANN. § 7129.81 (Supp. 1971). The emancipated minor
is not considered here. See text accompanying note 34, supra. In Ohio, a child living with
his parents is presumed unemancipated. Bagyi v. Miller, 3 Ohio App. 2d 371, 210 N.E.2d
387 (1965). See also OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.181 (Page 1969). The fact that
an unemancipated child resides with his parents does not mean that he is automatically
a Jehovah's Witness. A Jehovah's Witness must be spiritually mature (Heb. 6:1-3, 2
Tim. 2:15), and maturity requires sound knowledge of the Scriptures (Heb. 6:1, Phil.
1:9-11). A child must be trained in the teachings of Jehovah (Deut. 6:6, 7, Eph. 6:4);
be obedient to his parents as a Divine Requirement (Eph. 6:1, Col. 3:20); and be
baptized in the name of the Father (Matt. 28:19, Ps. 83:18, 2 Ki. 19:15, Isa. 33:22).
Make Sure of All Things-Hold Fast To What Is Fine, 41, 73, 342, 420 Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania (1965). A baptized minor child must not be
a wrongdoer. If reproof and discipline do not curtail wrongdoing, such as gross, loose
conduct or fornication, then the child shall be disfellowshipped. Even a nonbaptized
minor associated with a Jehovah's Witness congregation must adhere to the tenets of
Jehovah. Organization for Kingdom-Preaching and Disciple-Making, at 174, 175 Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania (1972).
7 See Pilpel and Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 786, 800.
72410 U.S. 179 (1972), rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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without parental consent."3 In a recent decision74 the California
Supreme Court held that unmarried pregnant minors could obtain
therapeutic abortions without their parents' consent.75
Juvenile courts should further bear in mind that minor children
have been accorded a status which commands protections guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights." The impact of decisions such as In re
Gault,77 Kent v. United States,78 and In re Winship79 is that some
constitutional safeguards once applicable to adults in criminal pro-
ceedings must now extend to minors. By having the Supreme Court
recognize children as a class rather than as devoid of any legal status,
their importance and recognition as individuals has transcended
obscurity. From the significance of these opinions and by extra-
polating judicial analyses from other medico-legal areas requiring
consent, 0 the choice of a mature child, whatever the age, would be
paramount in deciding whether the state will take temporary custody
of him. Only where the court has factually determined that the child
cannot comprehend the importance of his physical deficiency and
medical prognosis will the parent-state conflict reassert itself.
Conclusion
From examining religious freedom as applied to Jehovah's
Witnesses, the ability of those parents to refuse permission for their
child's transfusion, the doctrine of parens patriae, and child consent,
one conclusion is inescapable: the decision of a mature child of
Jehovah's Witness parentage, faced with a choice for or against
elective surgery, should be binding upon all parties. When the situation
includes a minor lacking the prerequisites for maturity, the result is
not so simply stated. The dilemma in discerning the child's welfare
from his parents' right to worship is whether there is a point along
some continuum where parens patriae must cease to dominate the
court. In other words, as the Green court asked itself, ". . . if spinal
surgery can be ordered, what about a hernia or gall bladder or a
hysterectomy?" Such a question cannot be precisely answered. Innum-
erable medical ailments, if left untreated, can lead to long term dis-
73 Pilpel and Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 787.
74 Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 484 P.2d 1345 (1971).
7SId., at 884, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 9, 484 P.2d at 1345.
76 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
77 Id.
7 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
79 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
0 On consent and constitutional protections accorded minors, see Pilpel and Zuckerman,
supra note 12, at 795-96. Judge Schwart, visiting juvenile court judge (Cuyahoga County
Juvenile Court) from Fayette County, Ohio, believes from his twelve years experience
on the bench that the 1969 revisions to Ohio's Juvenile Court Act have superceded the
impact of Gault. Interview with Judge Schwart, Dec. 12, 1972.
19741
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
ability. However, for a juvenile court to order custody when time
is not of the essence would be imprudent. For example, the parents are
told their child is suffering from some sort of cardiac insufficiency
which could be normalized by medicine, but that an operation of
moderate risk, requiring a transfusion, could alleviate the difficulty
now. Without the surgery, debilitating effects might occur two years
hence, but not such as to place the child's life in danger. Given these
facts, the juvenile court should abide by the parents' religious beliefs.
The present effect upon the child by not having the surgery is not in
such conflict with the state's self-perpetuating interest, for the court
to do otherwise. Yet, after a year's time should the child have
difficulty in performing his daily chores, attending class, or even
become semi-ambulatory because of his heart condition, then the
state's interest in protecting the child would be sufficiently great
for a custody order to be issued and the transfusion given.
Green and Sampson should also be used cautiously as precedent
in Ohio. The Sampson court should have asked for the child's prefer-
ence, even though further delay would neither alleviate his facial
deformity nor impair his health. The Green majority required that
Ricky be heard, but failed to place sufficient emphasis on his asthenic
medical and physical condition. Thus, for an Ohio juvenile court to
reject the significance of either case to the exclusion of the other
would be to jaundice the perspective of parens patriae in light of
religious freedom.
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